Mad Man's Blog

The Afghan war rumbles on with no victory in sight. Casualties mount on both sides, and even worse, perhaps, we are fast losing sight of what victory in Afghanistan would look like (if we ever knew of course). The reality is complicated by a sense of dull horror of not knowing what to do. Everything we assumed about war, about victory, about the nature of the enemy is inadequate in framing, or conceptualizing the war in Afghanistan. Certain philosophical insights might be useful however, and open up the possibility of understanding the reality of this long running and costly conflict.

War Machines Vs State’s

Deleuze and Guattari in ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ developed the idea of a ‘War Machine’ as an anarchic, exterior element not assimilated or subsumed by the State, defined, not in opposition to the State, but rather as a truly exterior entity, not fixed into the stratified order of the flows of energy, economy, biology, and power, that exemplify the State. The War Machine is populated by the band, a group of individuals, whose existence is Itinerant or ‘Nomadic’ whose space, or territory, is the territory of the Nomad. Straight away, you can understand why this particular concept might be relevant to Afghanistan, is not the Taliban a War Machine? Is not the effort to establish a ‘strong and stable Afghanistan’ an effort to establish a State? The position is more complex than this, because, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, the State to employs the War machine too. But the point is often lost, as to what the Taliban are, and why they fight. They are often portrayed as the Prince across the water, the other state that was pushed aside and is waiting in the wings to return to prominence. But is this so? This was perhaps, one of the primary errors committed in Afghanistan, the idea that the invasion was effectively targeted towards a State, as it was in Iraq. But where as, despite the violence and continued instability on Iraq, we are seeing progress, because the organelles of a State do exist, in Afghanistan, we see continued failure. In Afghanistan, there are nomadic communities. Not necessarily, geographically, as in, they uproot from given areas to other areas, but nomadic in terms of dependence upon seasons for activity, patterns of transition of political power (in relation to outside States, or internal struggles between clans etc. Afghanistan has, rarely (though perhaps briefly under communism, prior to the Soviet Invasion) been a space of the State as it is understood in modern history. It is not a country that is defined by a state exacting it’s limits of control, or at least it was not prior to the Coalition invasion. The Country of ’Afghanistan’ is not how far the Afghan State can extend it’s power, but, and crucially for us, it is the limit set by the existence of other States, their limits and their extent of control.

Afghanistan is not then, a space that is defined by the limit ‘Afghan state here but not there’ rather, the space, the ‘Nation’ (which following Weber should be separated from what we mean by State) is instead defined by ‘Neighbour State there, but not here’. This is evident in the twilight zone of ‘AfPakistan’ the border region where, like the space of convergence of two circles (artificial boundaries in reality) a shared space of the War Machine, the external element of two States, is as one. Why is this relevant? Because there is a fundamental ignorance of it, why did there not exist a State, but rather an ‘inverted State Space’ before the Invasion? The Taliban, should, in reality, be put alongside those unsuccessful Empire’s that attempted to conquer the region, and impose a State, they faced opposition, in the North in particular, and the extent to which they could establish the uniform ordered space of the State is evident by the brutality needed to try and enforce it, as Nietzsche knew, the extent to which a State punishes, is related to it’s strength and stability, weak States, are insecure, and hence more brutal as a result. The full area in which we now call ‘Afghanistan’ drawn as it is by the limits of its Neighbours extent of power, was not, under the Taliban, a State as such, or more precisely, did not control all the area that of the inverted State space.

We should therefore understand that attempts to build the Afghan State are ignorant as to why there was not really one before. It is not the case that one was needed. Afghanistan, as it is defined, was an assemblage of power structures, communities, clans, War Lords. The extent to which this was a ‘fundamentalist’ space is also debatable, the assumption that it was a fundamentalist Islamic State.

The Universal Vs the Local

The idea that, what resists the existence and long term future of a Democratic Afghan State is a ‘Islamic Fundamentalism’ is only partially true. It is perhaps too tempting to put into play the idea of a clash of civilizations, that Afghanistan is being fought over by two universal ideologies, a Western democratic capitalism, and a Islamic fundamentalism that seeks to establish a global Caliphate. Is this the end of it? Do we just need to wait until the Afghans realize the superiority of democracy and capitalism and then leave them to it? The problem is this, if, as many assume, the Taliban are a different kind of (Islamic) Fascism, then why can’t it be defeated in the same way that Liberal capitalism defeated other forms of fascism? A direct comparison, would be anachronistic, but the point for us is this, that fascism, in any form, is an ideology of a State. In which case, it’s conflict is with another State, or group of States. But the Taliban it is argued by us here, never really existed as an extensive State entity, and if it did exist as a State at all, it was a limited one. But now, it no longer exist as a State, but a War Machine. The ongoing conflict is not one generated by States in opposition to each other. It is generated by, as it often has been, a State entity attempting to impose itself on pre-existing, local collectives (which are the middle ground between the State centred around Kabul, and the Nomadic War Machine of the Taliban militia). Collectives whose identities are not derived from the State, but are generated at the local level. There is no universal ideology that is held by all local communities, sharing at best, only a few customs and religious practices. It is this very territory where the State, imposed from a central body, meets the local community, and this is the primary site of conflict in Afghanistan, one we are losing. The troops of the West and the Taliban enter these areas, periodically, and contest them, but the reason why, despite overwhelming victories for the Western troops, they must continue to contest these areas, is because of the conflict generated by the local and the universal (State). Why should local communities simply accept the authority of the State, one that is not generated by a collection of local communities, or an act of out and out conquest which they have no choice but to accept? What is interesting in Afghanistan, is the absurdity of the situation, we ask the local communities to effectively chose an imposition, to become complicit in the process of occupation. The limited extent of the Afghan State should then, show us that the local swill not accept, unconditionally, the universal dominance, that is, the State. And as it is a democratic state in question, it can not be forced through subjugation or conquest. It must be offered. But this forgets that the democratic State can not be flown in, it’s development in areas where there are pre-existing power structures must either be welcomed, or forced, or through a long process of assimilation it must take root. This is not happening in Afghanistan. To return to the point earlier, why did a fully fledged State not exist prior to the Coalition invasion? Is it because Afghanistan is primitive and backward? As some say? (such as the British defence secretary that arrogantly described Afghanistan as medieval 13th century country). Or is it simply the case, that the State is rejected, because one was not wanted or needed in the first place?

Who Needs a State Anyway?

The great problem of the State in the West, has, since Plato, been the attempt to find a natural State that exists to prevent the excesses of the ‘other’ State, that which is contrary too, or in opposition to the natural State. What prevents the State from being an imposition, is the assumption, always, that the State that we view as best, is legitimated because it exists as an organic entity, one which is in harmony with how things should be without the constraints of elements of disruption (say, anarchy, slave revolts, class domination etc). From Monarchy and Empire, through to a Dictatorship of the Proletariat, to Liberal Democracy, the idea has always been that no other State makes sense but the one preferred, which is not really a State at all, if States are constructs that is, rather, they are just an acceptance of the true ‘state of nature.’ All other States are artificial, impositions, only the State as it naturally ought be, should be accepted. Of course, no State is natural, it is the job of ideology to ensure this illusion is maintained, all State‘s represent some dominant power structures and ideology as false consciousness. But the Western problem of the State, is always seen through the necessary existence of the State, it can not be thought otherwise. What can save us from the excess of the State? Only the State itself. What if, though, what is actually more natural, or more organic, is for a space to exist where no State is needed at all? Where no State can ever be imposed? If the organic State is essentially a supposed reification of the ‘State of Nature’ and it’s only real justification is to prevent an unnatural State being imposed, then might it be possible to exist in a space where there is no State needed?

If Afghanistan is such a space, where it’s people do not seem to need a State in the Western sense, nor, in the sense of the Taliban attempt at a Islamic State, then why should one be imposed? Is the imposition essentially an extension of Liberal capitalism? Liberal capitalism is being shown to be something of a fraud in Afghanistan. After all, the way that Liberal capitalism wishes to be seen to function is as an antidote to the excesses of the State, by championing private interest, by empowering the subject, by offering choice. But the idea that the liberal capitalist space is immanently generated by the desires of individuals is false. It is only possible, when a space has been deterritorialized, fully, when it becomes the kind of space where it can operate unhindered and from where it can not be ‘reflected‘ in its true form back to the subjects it operates on. But it is unable, to accept that there maybe a space, where it is not wanted. In it’s attempt to deterritorialize Afghanistan, to clear the space where it can the embed itself in, liberal capitalism encounters resistance, from subjects who do not buy the illusion of it being immanently generated by there own oppressed desires. The resistance generates violence. The first step towards successful deterritorialization is for the existence of a State to be established, one that takes as its primary ideology, a form of Liberalism. The propagation of capitalism in Afghanistan, which, is the ideology we really invite its people (in the guise of liberal democracy) is only achievable by the scrubbing away of the pre-existing space of those stubborn elements that oppose it.

What we do not seem to want to accept, is that Afghanistan, a space defined by the limits of other States, does not want to adopt Statehood right now, not entirely. This is difficult to accept. We assume, that even the manner of defeat in Afghanistan, will necessarily involve Statehood. That is, that if we abandon the fledgling democratic Afghan State, then a Islamic Taliban State will take it’s place. But this is far from certain, and trades on the illusion that the old Taliban rulers had established a fully fledged State in the first place. Security issues come into question now, because we are fearful of the establishment of State organelles such as bases and encampments, from which a threat can be established. The threat is credible, as such places were the breeding grounds for horrendous attacks against the West. The existed, even in the days where the Taliban had limited control. But would they not be able to form a State again? Most likely not, because they are not wanted by the majority, they would be partial, still dangerous States, but this is all that is needed. After all, their own Universal ideology at times is in opposition to the local communities. We should also bear in mind that new power structures would likely emerge to oppose the Taliban State, or limit it just as it was resisted in the North by the Northern Alliance. I do not necessarily accept the argument of withdrawal here for these reasons, but much of the opposition to it is based on unfounded assumption of a strong Taliban state re-emerging and striking out at the West (when the Taliban only sheltered the foreign terrorists that carried out the 9/11 attacks, they did not participate themselves). The territory of Afghanistan itself, does not offer itself easily to the formation of a State. No wonder that its limits, which are really the limits of its neighbours, are natural barriers, harsh barren territories, mountain ranges, rivers. Internally, a clan system has remained in place, because it has never been destroyed, and it remains the primary mechanism of power distribution amongst the population beyond the big cities.

Conclusions

We may not ever be able to create an Afghan State, a State that can stand on its own feet. A State, if it is to exist in such a space, must either be imposed harshly upon it, and as this is not acceptable for the West, and unlikely to be possible by will of the likes of the Taliban, it must instead be internally generated. We, the West, do not have an adequate understanding of the internal structures and communities of Afghanistan, and we may well not like what the stages of formulation of a State would be, nor what form it would take. But we can not, in one breath mutter the term ‘democracy’ and then attempt to disregard the nature of the area in question, and attempt to impose it even if it is only tepidly received, no matter how well intentioned or subtly we attempt do so. But then the Afghan war, in its conceptual crisis, has descended into an effort to hope for the best. Beyond that, it is the future of our own ideology that is in doubt here, that it may not after all, be universally applicable. Beyond the interests of maintaining the viability of NATO, a curious effort is underway, that is, an inversion of the brutality of the Taliban, who attempted to enforce a State, from a position of weakness, we on the contrary, are attempting to show that the West can win the battle of ideology, because it is inherently stronger, and need only apply a light touch. Despite the cost, in money and lives, we are not committed to the Afghan war in the same way we where in the Second World War. And this highlights a interesting point, we want to show the superiority of the West, that was attacked from out of Afghanistan, by showing how easily we can destroy the aggressor and remake it in our own image. We do not need to conquer Afghanistan, we can just turn up, bat aside opposition, and expect the locals to become like us. Any more an aggressive approach, total war, risks pulling away the illusion that what we are doing in Afghanistan is an outlet of the grace and benevolence of our humanitarian ideology, and not an attempt to extend and enforce our ideology, and thus show it as superior, nor can we accept the notion that the war was an exercise in revenge, not just beating the Taliban to such an extent that they would not dare do so again, but to humiliate the Taliban by showing them that there ideology was on the wrong side of history. This delusion is hard to escape. Beyond the obvious valour and effort of the West’s troops, who achievements are as sand castles, swept away as the leave and the tide returns. We can not ‘win’ in Afghanistan, in any conventional sense. We must learn to understand what this country really is, and what we are really trying to achieve and why, before we shall see credible progress.